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A Rational Foundation of Procrastination∗
Joosung Lee† Daniel Z. Li‡
Abstract
In a framework of finite sequential search, we define and characterize a decision
maker’s time preference, which is endogenous to her optimal search decisions. The
induced time preference is non-stationary and context-dependent, which support
key empirical and experimental evidence, such as procrastination, i.e., the discount
factor is increasing over time, and wealth effect, i.e., poor people tend to discount
more. We further identify cost effect and encouragement effect, to provide insights
into how the decision-maker’s environment and ability relate to her time prefer-
ence. Calibration results show that our endogenous time preference ts better to the
quasi-hyperbolic discount model than the hyperbolic or exponential model.
Keywords: Non-stationary time preference; Context-dependent time preference;
Adaptive search; Procrastination; Wealth effect; Cost effect; (Quasi-)Hyperbolic
Discounting
JEL Classification Code: D81, D83; D91
1 Introduction
Since Samuelson (1937), the discounted-utility (DU) model, in which a decision maker
exponentially discounts future value at a fixed rate, has been dominantly employed in
quantitative analyses of intertemporal decision making, due to its analytical tractability.
As Frederick et al. (2002) highlighted, its tractability relies on the assumption that the
various motives underlying intertemporal decision are abstracted into a single parameter,
the discount rate, which is fixed over time. Over the last four decades, however, the central
assumption of the DU model has been challenged at least in two aspects, stationarity and
exogeneity.
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First, since Thaler (1981), abundant empirical/behavioural evidence observes procras-
tination or decreasing impatience – people tend to discount more in near future, while
are less sensitive to distant futures. This evidence finds the stationarity assumption in-
adequate as a descriptive model. As such, alternative models have been proposed and
developed. Among many, Ainslie and Herrnstein (1981) and Mazur (1987) propose a
single-parameter hyperbolic discounting model, Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) introduce
a two-parameter hyperbolic discounting model, and Phelps and Pollak (1968), Laibson
(1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), Gruber and Ko¨szegi (2001), and Be´nabou and
Tirole (2004) study a quasi-hyperbolic discounting model.1
Although those parametric models are useful as a descriptive model, it is unclear where
these exogenous parameters of time preferences come from. As Samuelson (1937) himself
asserted the limitations of the DU model, there is no foundation to assume that “the
individual behaves so as to maximize an integral of the form envisaged in” the model.
The other parametric models mentioned above are also share the same limitation of
exogeneity. Various studies have found that the time preference is endogenously driven
by environments rather than exogenously given as an individual’s characteristic. For
instance, Thaler (1981), Benzion et al. (1989), Green et al. (1994), and Kirby et al. (1999)
identify the magnitude effect – small outcomes are discounted more; similarly, Lumley
(1997) and Moseley (2001) find the wealth effect – poor people discount more. Recently,
Watts et al. (2018)’s large-scale long-term experiment highlights the importance economic
background in time preference and criticizes the traditional view, such as Mischel et al.
(1989), which takes time preference as willpower exogenously given.
In this paper, we examine a finite sequential search problem, in which an agent’s time
preference is endogenously determined by the environment and her own optimal search
decisions. We show that this derived time preference is non-stationary and context-
dependent, and matches the key empirical and experimental evidence. To be specific,
a decision maker chooses her search intensity adaptively in each period, observing her
outcomes currently available, or the fall-back value. The optimal search intensity is
then determined by her fall-back value and the time remaining until the deadline as
1See Angeletos et al. (2001) and Frederick et al. (2002) for an overview of the relevant literature.
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well as her search technology, which captures her ability and environments. Based on
the optimal search intensity, which incorporates her future search plan and all the other
available information at the moment, the decision maker subjectively perceives utility
level form her current fall-back value. The dynamics of the optimal search intensity and
the subjective utility induce time preference.
The endogenous time preference confirms empirical/behavioural evidence, such as
procrastination (or decreasing impatience) and wealth effect (or magnitude effect), as a
result of rational decision making, instead of viewing them as anomalies. In addition, we
find that the procrastination tendency disappears as deadline approaches (i.e., deadline
effect), as the behavioral evidence reported by Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002). We also
discuss the cost effect and the encouragement effect to investigate the links between
the decision maker’s ability/environment and her time preference endogenously driven.
Calibration results in numerical examples show that the endogenous time preference fits
better to the quasi-hyperbolic model than the hyperbolic model or the DU model.
2 Preliminaries
Let X be the set of outcomes. A decision maker has a preference over the outcomes,
characterized by a utility function U : X → R+. Let σ(U) denote the σ-algebra generated
by U . Her search technology is characterized by a probability measure P attached to the
measurable space (X, σ(U)) together with a unit search cost c. Define the distribution
function F of the random variable U by F (u) := P (Iu) with Iu := {x ∈ X | U(u) <
u}. Assume EU < ∞. For a search with intensity m ∈ R+, at the cost of mc, she
independently draws m samples from the probability space (X, σ(U), P ). Let U
(1)
m be the
maximum utility level from m independent draws, which follows a distribution function
F
(1)
m := Fm(u) = (P (Iu))
m. As in the literature such as Morgan (1983), we allow search
intensity m to take real values in our analysis.
An initial utility u0 = u(x0) is endowed, given x0 ∈ X. In each period t = 0, 1, · · · , T−
1, observing her current outcomes available, or equivalently, its corresponding utility ut,
she chooses search intensity mt for a better outcome. A search rule is a sequence of
contingent plans of search intensity, denoted by m := (mt)
T−1
t=0 . To be specific, at the
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beginning of each period t, contingent on the current utility ut, a searcher chooses her
intensitymt : Im(U)→ R+ of that period, where Im(U) is the image space of U . Note that
she can skip searching in that period by choosing mt = 0, or stop searching permanently
by choosing (mτ = 0)
T−1
τ=t .
Assume that the decision maker can reclaim a previously declined outcome at no extra
search cost. Hence, her utility is determined by the highest outcome she has discovered
so far, which evolves according to u0 = U(x0) and, for any t = 1, · · · , T − 1,
ut := max
!
ut−1, u(1)mt−1
"
, (1)
where u
(1)
mt−1 is the realization of U
(1)
mt−1 , the utility from the best search outcome in period
t− 1 with intensity mt−1. At the period T , her final utility is determined by uT = uT−1
as she has no further search opportunity, i.e., mT = 0. Without causing confusion, we
may suppress the subscript t in mt and ut.
At the beginning of period t, define the decision maker’s perceived value Wt(u) to her
current utility u by following an optimal search rule from period t till the deadline. The
Bellman equation for the dynamic problem is thus: for t = 0, · · · , T − 1,
Wt(u) := max
#
u,max
m≥0
EWt+1
$
max
!
u, U (1)m
"%−mc& , (2)
and WT (u) = u.
The two lemmas below characterize the optimal search rule m∗ := (m∗τ )
T−1
τ=0 and the
value function Wt, defined on Im(U), induced by m
∗. The proofs can be found in Ap-
pendix.
Lemma 1 (Optimal Search Rule). Let u¯ denote the unique solution to' ∞
u¯
| lnF (w)|dw = c. (3)
The optimal search rule (m∗τ )
T−1
τ=0 is given by
i. if u < u¯ then m∗t (u) > 0 is the unique solution to
c =
' ∞
u
W ′t+1(w)F
m(w)| lnF (w)|dw; (4)
ii. if u ≥ u¯, then m∗t (u) = 0 and the searcher stops searching.
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Lemma 2 (Value Function). Given the current utility u, the value function Wt(u) is
Wt(u) = Emax
(
u, U
(1)
M∗t (u)
)
(5)
and the marginal value W ′t (u) is
W ′t (u) = F
(1)
M∗t
(u), (6)
where U
(1)
M∗t (u)
is the expected utility of the best outcome by following the optimal search rule
from period t till the last period, and its distribution function is F
(1)
M∗t
(u) :=
*
τ≥t F
m∗τ (u)(u).
Note that the value function Wt(u) reflect how the decision maker perceives the cur-
rent utility u at period t. This perceived value also depends on her objective ability
or environment (i.e., F and c) through her “subjective” plan of future search intensity,
(m∗τ )τ≥t. Lemma 3, of which proof appear in Appendix, summarizes the properties of
optimal search rule.
Lemma 3 (Submodularity of Optimal Intensity). The optimal search intensity m∗t (u)
is strictly decreasing in u ≤ u¯ ( fall-back value effect) and strictly increasing in t < T
(deadline effect). Furthermore,
1. The fall-back value effect is increasing in t, that is, for any u ≤ u¯,
t < t′ =⇒
++++dm∗t (u)du
++++ ≤ ++++dm∗t′(u)du
++++ . (7)
2. The deadline effect is diminishing in u ≤ u¯, that is, for any t < T − 1,
u < u′ ≤ u¯ =⇒ m∗t+1(u)−m∗t (u) < m∗t+1(u′)−m∗t (u′). (8)
3 The Induced Time Preference
This section defines the induced time preference from the search model with intensity
choice. For any utility u ≥ u0 at period s, let vt,s(u) denote the future equivalent utility
at t > s, that is, Ws(u) = Wt(vt,s(u)). As F (u) > 0 for any u ≥ u0, (6) implies Wt(u) is
strictly increasing and hence vt,s(u) is uniquely determined by
vt,s(u) := W
−1
t (Ws(u)). (9)
Lemma 4 summarizes some basic properties of the future equivalent utility.
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(b) Discount function Dt(u) := u/vt,0(u) decreases
over time (u = 0.4): Farther futures are discounted
more.
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(d) Per-period discount function δt(u) :=
u/vt,t−1(u) increases over time (u = 0.4):
The decision maker is more sensitive in nearer
future.
Figure 1: Procrastination: A Numerical Example (F ∼ Uniform[0, 1], c = 0.1, T = 5)
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Lemma 4. For any u0 < u < u¯ and any s < t ≤ T ,
i) vt,s(u) > u
ii) 0 <
dvt,s(u)
du
=
W ′s(u)
W ′t (vt,s(u))
< 1
Proof. By (6), recall that W ′τ (v) is strictly increasing both in τ and u < u¯. Take any
u < u¯ and any s < t ≤ T . Due to Lemma 1 and 2, as Wt(u¯) = Ws(u¯) and W ′t (u) > W ′s(u),
we have Wt(u) < Ws(u). This implies u < W
−1
t (Ws(u)), which proves the first part. By
(9), it follows that
dvt,s(u)
du
=
W ′s(u)
W ′t (vt,s(u))
<
W ′s(vt,s(u))
W ′t (vt,s(u))
< 1,
where the first inequality comes from the first part and the monotonicity of W ′s(v) in
v; and the last inequality is due to the monotonicity of W ′τ (u) in τ . Furthermore, as
W ′s(u) > 0, we have dvt,s(u)/du > 0, which completes the proof.
Comparing the equivalent utilities over two different periods, we define a context-
dependent discount function.
Definition (Context-Dependent Discount Function). A discount function Dt(u) is de-
fined by the ratio of the present utility u in period 0 to the future equivalent utility vt,0(u)
in period t, that is,
Dt(u) :=
u
vt,0(u)
. (10)
A per-period discount function δt(u) between two adjacent periods t and t − 1 is also
defined by
δt(u) :=
u
vt,t−1(u)
. (11)
Note that the decision maker discounts her future utilitymore when a smaller discount
function is associated, as u = Dt(u)vt,0(u) = δt(u)vt,t−1(u).
Proposition 1 below presents the wealth effect in time preference, that is, the decision
maker discounts more when her current utility level is low. This theoretical result confirms
the behavioural observation that “smaller rewards are discounted more” (Thaler, 1981;
Benzion et al., 1989; Green et al., 1994; Kirby et al., 1999), as well as empirical evidence
that “poor people tend to discount more” (Lumley, 1997; Moseley, 2001).
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Proposition 1 (Wealth Effect and Gratification). Both the discount function Dt(u) and
the single-period discount function δt(u) are strictly increasing in u0 < u ≤ u¯. For any
u ≥ u¯, future utility does not discounted, that is, Dt(u) = δt(u) = 1.
Proof. Suppose u < u¯. Differentiating u = Dt(u)vt,0(u) and u = δt(u)vt,t−1(u) yields
dDt(u)
du
vt,0(u) = 1− dvt,0(u)
du
Dt(u) and (12)
dδt(u)
du
vt,t−1(u) = 1− dvt,t−1(u)
du
δt(u). (13)
Due to Lemma 4, we have dvt,0(u)/du < 1 and dvt,t−1(u)/du < 1. Furthermore, as
Dt(u) < 1 and δt(u) < 1, it follows that both (12) and (13) are strictly positive. Thus,
dDt(u)/du > 0 and dδt(u)/du > 0, as required. For any u ≥ u¯, by Lemma 1, we have
m∗t (u) = 0 and Wt(u) = u for any t = 0, 1, · · ·T −1, which implies Dt(u) = δt(u) = 1.
Our search theoretic model provides a clear intuition of the wealth effect. In this
framework, time is costly because it involves with costly search efforts. With a lower
utility, the decision maker searches more intensively and time is more costly. However, if
her current utility is higher, she searches less intensively. Formally, as the optimal search
effort m∗t (u) is decreasing in u, the discount function Dt(u) is increasing in u, that is,
the decision maker discounts her future utility less with a higher u. Furthermore, the
proposition implies the existence of “gratification level” – the decision maker does not
discount her future utility any more if her current utility is sufficiently high, because she
stops searching.
Remark. It also hints that discounting crucially relies on the existence of a deadline. As
T goes to infinity, from Lemma 1, the optimal search intensity m∗t converges to zero for
any t and the discount function Dt(u) and δt(u) goes to unity for any t and u. That is,
a decision maker with eternal life is extremely patience and does not discount future as
she will eventually achieve an ideal utility level only with negligible cost.
4 A Foundation of Procrastination
This section proves that the single-period discount function increases over time, that is,
the decision maker discounts more for nearer futures but less for farther periods.
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Theorem 1 (Procrastination). For any u0 ≤ u < u¯, δt(u) strictly increases in t.
For notational convenience, let Gt(u) := F
m∗t (u)(u) and Ht(u) :=
*
τ≥t Gτ (u). As U
(1)
M∗t
follows Ht, the value function can be represented by
Wt(u) = uHt(u) +
' ∞
u
wdHt(w)
= u+ 1(u ≤ u¯)
' u¯
u
[1−Ht(w)] dw. (14)
Lemma 5. For any u0 ≤ u < u¯, we have
Gt−1(u) < Gt(vt(u)).
Proof. Let K(u,λ) := Gt−1(u) − Gt(λvt,t−1(u)) + (1 − λ)u). Take any u0 < u < u¯. We
need to show K(u, 1) < 0. Taking a derivative of K(u,λ) with respect to λ yields
dK(u,λ)
dλ
= −G′t(λvt,t−1(u)) + (1− λ)u) · (vt,t−1(u)− u) ≤ 0,
where the inequality comes from G′t(λvt,t−1(u)) + (1− λ)u) ≥ 0 and u < vt,t−1(u). Thus,
for any λ > 0, it follows that K(u,λ) ≤ K(u, 0). Finally, as m∗t−1(u) < m∗t (u), we have
K(u, 0) = Gt−1(u)−Gt(u) < 0, which confirms K(u, 1) ≤ K(u, 0) < 0.
Proof of Theorem 1. Take any t = 1, 2, · · · , T − 1. We prove that vt(u) > vt+1(u) for
any u0 ≤ u < u¯. As Wt+1 is strictly increasing in u0 ≤ u < u¯, we now show R(u) :=
Wt+1(vt(u)) −Wt+1(vt+1(u)) > 0 for any u < u¯. Taking a derivative, due to Lemma 2,
we have
R′(u) = Ht+1(vt,t−1(u)) · dvt,t−1(u)
du
−Ht(u).
As dvt,t−1(u)/du = Ht−1(u)/Ht(vt,t−1(u)) due to Lemma 4, it follows that
R′(u) = Ht(u) ·
,
Gt−1(u)
Gt(vt,t−1(u))
− 1
-
< 0, (15)
where the inequality comes from Lemma 5. Observing R(u¯) = 0, (15) confirms that
R(u) > 0 for any u < u¯, as desired.
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5 Context Dependency of Time Preference
To further investigate the role of environments on the time preference, explicitly take the
search technology, marginal search cost c and the distribution F , as additional parameters.
Proposition 2 shows that the decision maker with a better technology in terms of her
search cost discounts less as future utility involves with less cost.
Proposition 2 (Cost Effect). Decision maker with higher cost discounts more. That is,
for any c < c′, it holds
δt(u; c) ≥ δt(u; c′).
Proof. We show dvt,t−1(u; c)/dc < 0. Applying the envelope theorem to (2) with respect
to c, we have
∂Wt(vt,t−1(u; c); c)
∂c
= −m∗t (vt,t−1(u; c); c) and
∂Wt−1(u; c)
∂c
= −m∗t−1(u; c).
As Lemma 5 implies m∗t−1(u; c) > m
∗
t (vt,t−1(u; c); c), it follows
∂Wt(vt,t−1(u; c); c)
∂c
>
∂Wt−1(u; c)
∂c
. (16)
Differentiating Wt(vt,t−1(u; c); c) = Wt−1(u; c) with respect to c yields
W ′t (vt,t−1(u; c); c)
dvt,t−1(u; c)
dc
+
∂Wt(vt,t−1(u; c); c)
∂c
=
∂Wt−1(u; c)
∂c
. (17)
Since W ′t (vt,t−1(u; c); c) > 0 due to Lemma 2, (16) and (17) yield dvt,t−1(u; c)/dc < 0, as
desired.
In terms of search distribution, however, a better technology does not always make her
discount less. For utility high enough, a decision maker with a worse search technology
may stop searching; while a better technology encourages search more intensively. Hence,
A decision maker with a better technology could discount more. Example 1 illustrates
how a better search technology encourages discounting future utility.
Example 1 (Encouragement Effect). Let FL = x · 1(0 ≤ x ≤ 1) and FH = x/2 · 1(0 ≤
x ≤ 2). Note FH stochastically dominates FL. For any c ∈ (0, c¯), where c¯ is the solution
to
.∞
u0
| lnFH(w)|dw = c, we have u¯(c, FH) > u¯(c, FL). Thus, there exists u < u¯(c, FL),
such that for any u < u < u¯(c, FH) and any t,
δt(u; c, FL) > δt(u; c, FH).
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6 Comparisons to (Quasi-) Hyperbolic Discounting
In this section, we compare the discount function endogenously induced by the optimal
search rule with the well-known parametric models, such as exponential, hyperbolic, and
quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
In the exponential model, also known as the discounted-utility model, assuming a fixed
rate over time, the discount function DEt is determined by, given a single parameter δ,
DEt = δ
t. (exponential)
Since Samuelson (1937), due to its mathematical simplicity and its similarity to the com-
pound interest formula, the exponential model has been dominantly adopted in almost
all quantitative intertemporal decision making problems for almost a century, although
it lacks clear motivations and foundations.
While the exponential model is still widely used, since Thaler (1981), the discrepancies
between the exponential model and the empirical/behavioural evidence has been observed
and studied across the areas of economics and psychology. In particular, based on the
phenomena of decreasing impatience or procrastination, the hyperbolic model has been
proposed. Given a single parameter α, the discount function DHt is determined by
DHt =
1
1 + αt
. (Hyperbolic)
As a variation of hyperbolic mode, based on the phenomena of present bias, the quasi-
hyperbolic model suggests a discount function DQt with two parameters,
DQt =
/
1 if t = 0
βδt if t > 0.
(Quasi-hyperbolic)
To calibrate the parameters, we consider a search-intensity model with T = 5, F (u) =
u1(0 < u < 1), and c = 0.1. For two different initial utility levels, u = 0.2 and u = 0.5,
the parameters are choses to minimize the sum of the squares of differences from the
endogenous discount function as in (10).
The endogenous model supports the quasi-hyperbolic discounting, as it shows a strong
present bias. In particular, with a lower initial utility level, u = 0.2, the difference
between Dt(u) and D
Q
t is negligible. With a higher initial utility level, u = 0.5, all
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Figure 2: Comparison to Parametric Models
the three parametric models are almost linear, while the endogenous model still presents
increasing per-period discount function in later periods.
7 Conclusion
The search-theoretic model induces non-stationary context-dependent time preferences,
which are consistent with empirical/behavioral evidence, such as procrastination, wealth
effect, cost effect, and encourage effect. The calibration results confirm that the induced
time preference fits well to the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model. While the model
endogenously induces time preferences, an exogenously given discount factor can still be
integrated into the model for richer analyses.
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A Missing Proofs
This appendix presents the proofs of Lemma 1, 2, and 3, in Section 2. These proofs also
can be found in Lee and Li (2019). For given u, we define the expected revenue Rt(m; u)
of choosing intensity m by
Rt(m; u) := EWt+1
$
max
!
u, U (1)m
"%
= u+
' ∞
u
0
1−W ′t+1(w)Fm(w)
1
dw. (18)
Applying the envelop theorem to (2) and (18) yields
W ′t (u) = F
m∗t (u)(u)W ′t+1(u), (19)
which shows a recurrence relationship between the marginal search values of two adjacent
periods. In particular, note that m∗t (u) = 0 implies W
′
t (u) = W
′
t+1(u). Further define the
marginal revenue MRt(m; u) of increasing intensity m by
MRt(m; u) :=
∂Rt(m; u)
∂m
=
' ∞
u
W ′t+1(w)F
m(w)| lnF (w)|dw. (20)
It follows that, for any t < T and any u ≥ 0,
MRt(m; u) <∞ and lim
m→∞
MRt(m; u) = 0; (21)
m < m′ =⇒ MRt(m; u) > MRt(m′; u); (22)
for any t < T and any m ≥ 0,
u < u′ =⇒ MRt(m; u) ≥MRt(m; u′); (23)
and for any t < T , any u ≥ 0, and any m ≥ 0,
MRt(m; u) ≤MRt+1(m; u). (24)
Note that (23) and (24) hold with strict inequality iff m > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. First note that (21) ensures that the solution to
(4) is unique and that the cutoff value u¯ in (3) is also unique. Recall that WT (u) = u
and W ′T (u) = 1 for any u.
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Step 1: t = T − 1. For any u ≥ u¯, as MRT−1(m; u) ≤ MRT−1(m; u¯) ≤ MRT−1(0; u¯) =
c, the optimal intensity is m∗T−1(u) = 0. If u < u¯, then the optimal inten-
sity m∗T−1(u) is the unique solution to (4) and (19) confirms that W
′
T−1(u) =
Fm
∗
T−1(u)(u). Using the boundary condition WT−1 (u¯) = u¯, we then have
WT−1(u) = u¯−
' u¯
u
W ′T−1(w)dw = u¯−
' u¯
u
Fm
∗
T−1(w)(w)dx = Emax
(
u, U
(1)
m∗T
)
.
Lastly, we will verify the distribution function F
(1)
M∗T−1
(u) is well defined. By (23),
m∗T−1(u) is continuous and non-increasing (strictly decreasing for u < u¯). Taking a
derivative of F
(1)
M∗T−1
(u) yields, for any u ∕= u¯,
dF
(1)
M∗T−1
(u)
du
= Fm
∗
T−1(u)(u)
,
dm∗T−1(u)
du
lnF (u) +m∗T−1(u)
f(u)
F (u)
-
≥ 0,
where the inequality holds strictly if and only if u < u¯. Thus, F
(1)
M∗T−1
(u) is continuous
and non-decreasing and it indeed defines a distribution function.
Step 2: t ≤ T − 2. As an induction hypothesis, assuming the statements in Lemma 1
and Lemma 2 hold for t+1, t+2, · · · , T −1, we need to prove they are also true for
period t. From (24), it follows that MRt(m; u) ≤MRt+1(m; u), where the equality
holds if and only if u ≥ u¯, provided that the statement is true for later periods. If
u ≥ u¯, then MRt(m; u) = MRT−1(m; u) ≤ MRT−1(0, u¯) = c and hence m∗t (u) = 0
is optimal. For any u < u¯, (23) ensures the unique solution toMRt(m; u) = c, which
is the optimal intensity m∗t (u). The result (6) for the marginal search value W
′
t (u) is
straightforward from (19) by the induction hypothesis. As m∗t (u) = 0 ⇐⇒ u ≥ u¯,
use a boundary condition of Wt(u¯) = u¯ to recover Wt(u) from W
′
t (u), that is,
Wt(u) = u¯−
' u¯
u
W ′t (w)dw = u¯−
' u¯
u
F
(1)
M∗t
(w)dw = u+
' u¯
u
2
1− F (1)M∗t (w)
3
dw,
which is equivalent to (14), as desired. By (23), m∗τ (u) is again continuous and
non-increasing (strictly decreasing for u < u¯) for τ = t, t + 1, · · · , T − 1. Taking a
derivative of F
(1)
M∗t
(u), we have
dF
(1)
M∗t
(u)
du
= F
(1)
M∗t
(u)
456
τ≥t
dm∗τ (u)
du
7
· lnF (u) +
56
τ≥t
m∗τ (u)
7
f(u)
F (u)
8
≥ 0, (25)
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where the inequality holds strictly if and only if u < u¯. As F
(1)
M∗t
(u) is continuous
and non-decreasing, it indeed defines a distribution function. Induction argument
then completes that the sequence (m∗t )t=0,··· ,T−1 constructs the optimal search rule
in Lemma 1 and the value function in Lemma 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. Lemma 1 and (23) imply the fall-back value effect, i.e., m∗t (u)
is strictly decreasing in u ≤ u¯. Lemma 1 and (24) imply the deadline value effect, i.e.,
m∗t (u) is strictly increasing in t ≤ T − 1. Applying the implicit function theorem to (4),
it follows that,
dm∗t (u)
du
= − ∂MRt(m; u)/∂u
∂MRt(m; u)/∂m
+++++
m=m∗(u)
= − −W
′
t+1(u)F
m∗(u)(u)| lnF (u)|
− .∞
u
W ′t+1(x)Fm
∗(u)(w) ln2 F (w)dw
< 0.
(26)
Letting λ(w, u) := F
m∗t (u)(u)
Fm
∗
t (u)(w)
· Fm
∗
t+1(u)(w)
F
m∗t+1(w)(w)
, we have
dm∗t+1(u)
du
= − W
′
t+1(u)F
m∗t (u)(u)| lnF (u)|.∞
u
λ(w, u) ·W ′t+1(w)Fm∗t (u)(w) ln2 F (w)dw
<
dm∗t (u)
du
, (27)
where the inequality is from that 0 < λ(w, u) < 1 for any w > u. This proves (7), that
is, the fall-back value effect is increasing. Integrating (27), it further follows that, for any
u < u′,
0 > m∗t (u
′)−m∗t (u) > m∗t+1(u′)−m∗t+1(u),
which implies (8), that is, the deadline effect is diminishing.
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